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ABSTRACT
The idea that there might be multiple universes with diﬀerent
parameters of nature is often considered an attractive response to
the ﬁnding that various parameters appear to be delicately ﬁne-
tuned for life. The present paper investigates whether the appeal
to ﬁne-tuning can legitimately be combined with an appeal to
independent empirical evidence for other universes or whether, as
suggested by Cory Juhl, combining such appeals inevitably results
in illegitimate double counting of the ﬁnding that the parameters
are right for life. In doing so, the paper takes into account the fact
that the parameters’ life-friendliness is old evidence for us, which
makes Bayesianism’s problem of old evidence relevant to
Bayesian analysis of its evidential impact. Ultimately, the verdict
reached is that the warning of double counting is helpful, but that
double counting can in principle be avoided. The paper highlights
remaining independent challenges against the ﬁne-tuning
argument for the multiverse.
1. Introduction: Why the Multiverse?
According to the multiverse hypothesis, there are multiple universes, some of them radi-
cally diﬀerent from our own. Many physicists and at least some philosophers are attracted
to this hypothesis because they regard it as oﬀering a promising response to the perennial
puzzle that many parameters of nature appear to be ﬁne-tuned for life: had they been even
slightly diﬀerent, life could not possibly have existed. For example, had the diﬀerence
between the masses of the two lightest quarks, the up-quark and the down-quark, been
slightly diﬀerent, the stability of the proton and the neutron, which are bound states of
these quarks, would have been aﬀected (Carr and Rees 1979; Hogan 2000, section 4;
Hogan 2007). This would have likely resulted in a much simpler and less complex universe
where bound states of quarks other than the proton and neutron dominate. Life would also
not have appeared, as it seems, if the mass of the electron, which is roughly 10 times
smaller than the mass diﬀerence between the down- and up-quark, had been somewhat
larger in relation to that diﬀerence. Fine-tuning of the lightest quark masses with
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respect to the strength of the weak force has been found as well (Barr and Khan 2007).
Further suggested instances of ﬁne-tuning concern the strength of gravity, the strength
of the strong and weak nuclear forces (when measured against that of electromagnetism
as a reference), the vacuum energy density, the overall energy density of the universe in
its very early stages, the relative amplitude of energy density ﬂuctuations in the very
early universe, the initial entropy of the universe, and the form of the known laws of
nature itself.1
The ﬁnding that life requires ﬁnely tuned parameters has been cited as support for the idea
of divine creation (e.g. Swinburne 2004; Collins 2012), but the multiverse idea may oﬀer an
attractive non-theistic alternative: if there is a suﬃciently diverse multiverse where the par-
ameters vary between universes, it is only to be expected that there is at least one universe
where they are right for life. Trivially, observations can only be made where the parameters
are right for life,2 and the multiverse inhabitants—if there are any—will unavoidably measure
apparently ﬁne-tuned parameters. According to this line of thought, the multiverse idea may
remove the puzzle of why we exist despite the required ﬁne-tuning of the parameters and,
derivatively, why we ﬁnd the parameters ﬁne-tuned for life.
This paper assesses a speciﬁc worry about belief in the multiverse as based on this ﬁne-
tuning argument: that such belief would inevitably rely on illegitimate double counting of
the ﬁne-tuning evidence and would hence be irrational (Juhl 2007). Double-counting, to
use an example by Juhl (2007, 554f.), occurs when a prosecutor in court ﬁrst appeals to the
fact that some person’s ﬁngerprints are on the murder weapon to argue that we should
seriously consider the possibility that she might be the murderer and then argues that,
in view of the fact that her ﬁngerprints are on the murder weapon, we should now
become more conﬁdent that she really is the murderer. It is uncontroversial that such
double counting is fallacious. According to Juhl, it is committed by any attempt to run
the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse in combination with purportedly independent
empirical support for the multiverse. The problem that he sees is that any suggested inde-
pendent empirical evidence for a multiverse—in virtue of having been obtained in this
(life-friendly) universe—would likely entail that the parameters are right for life here. If
that is the case, appealing to ﬁne-tuning in addition to further empirical evidence does
indeed amount to double counting of the evidence that the parameters are right for life
despite the required ﬁne-tuning.
In a nutshell, the double counting charge comes down to the following dilemma for pro-
ponents of the multiverse: either they rely on the ﬁne-tuning argument, but then they have to
accept that there are no good independent reasons for taking the multiverse hypothesis
seriously in the ﬁrst place; or they insist on having a solid independent motivation for the mul-
tiverse hypothesis, but then they are no longer able to run the ﬁne-tuning argument. If the
dilemma is correctly diagnosed, the case for (or against) the multiverse may be doomed to
remain inconclusive forever—or at least as long as we do not have overwhelming independent
evidence for (or against) a multiverse that renders the appeal to ﬁne-tuning obsolete.
The double counting worry can be formulated succinctly when set up as an objection
against the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse in its Bayesian formulation, using sub-
jective probabilities. The assessment of this formulation is complicated, however, by the
fact that, as pointed out by Monton (2006), Leeds (2007), and Collins (2012), the ﬁne-
tuning of the parameters is inevitably old evidence for us: that the parameters are right
for life is something that we have long known, even if we may assess the ﬁne-tuning’s
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rational signiﬁcance only now. This means that to properly investigate the double counting
charge in Bayesian terms, we must, at least provisionally, adopt some solution to Bayesian-
ism’s long-standing problem of old evidence (Glymour 1980). Following Monton’s track
(and, similarly, that of Collins 2012, section 4.3), this paper adopts Colin Howson’s so-
called ur-probability solution (Howson 1991). Based on it, the verdict reached is that
double counting of the ﬁne-tuning evidence is indeed a potential issue which, however,
can in principle be avoided. On the way to this verdict, the paper highlights independent
challenges against the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse that remain.
2. The Fine-tuning Argument for the Multiverse and its Criticisms
The argument from ﬁne-tuning for the multiverse is frequently formulated in Bayesian
terms, using subjective probability assignments, and it is in the context of the Bayesian for-
mulation that the double counting charge can be neatly raised.3 An elementary version of the
Bayesian formulation has the form of a comparison of our rational credences in a single-
universe hypothesis U and a rival multiverse hypothesis M. (In terms of notation, the
present exposition broadly follows Bradley 2009.) According toU, there is only a single uni-
verse with the same values of the parameters throughout space and time; according to M,
there are many universes with wildly diﬀering values of the parameters across universes.4
For the sake of simplicity and ease of exposition, we make the simplifying assumptions
that U and M are both sharply deﬁned and the only hypotheses that deserve serious con-
sideration. Furthermore, we assume that the ﬁne-tuning evidence R (‘R’ for ‘right’) to be
considered is that, despite the required ﬁne-tuning, there is at least one universe with the
right parameters for life. There are serious criticisms of these assumptions, as discussed
further below.
Let us consider the rational impact of the ﬁnding R that the parameters are right for life
on our credences with respect to U and M. According to standard Bayesian conditioning,
our posteriors after taking R into account are given by our prior conditional credences
P(M |R) and P(U |R). By Bayes’ theorem, their ratio is
P(M |R)
P(U |R) =
P(R |M)
P(R |U)
P(M)
P(U)
. (1)
Centred around this equation, the ﬁne-tuning argument proceeds as follows: if the multi-
verse according toM is suﬃciently vast and varied that life will unavoidably appear at least
somewhere in it, the conditional prior P(R |M) receives a value close to 1. In contrast, inas-
much as life-friendly values require delicate ﬁne-tuning, the conditional prior P(R |U) will
receive a value close to 0. Since P(R |M)≫ P(R |U), thus established, entails
P(R |M)/P(R |U)≫ 1, the ratio of posteriors is much larger than the ratio of the
priors, i.e. P(M |R)/P(U |R)≫ P(M)/P(U). Thus, according to this line of thought, the
evidence R strongly supports M over U. Unless our priors dramatically favour the
single universe over the multiverse in that P(U)≫ P(M), our posteriors strongly favour
the multiverse over the single universe. Accordingly, the argument concludes, our cre-
dence in the multiverse should be high.
That this argument remains controversial is unsurprising because it can be criticised at
every step. For example, one may doubt whether it is indeed legitimate to consider only
one single-universe hypothesis U and one multiverse hypothesis M in the absence of a
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well-developed and well-structured hypothesis space. Next, it is unclear whether we
should really be perplexed by the ﬁnding that the parameters are right for life absent,
for example, some physically well-motivated probability distribution over possible
values of the parameters which would give us good reasons to indeed ascribe a minuscule
value to P(R |U).5 Perhaps some or even many of the apparently ﬁne-tuned parameters
had to have their actual values due to basic physical reasons that we presently do not
understand.
What makes the argument in the above form even more problematic is that R—that the
parameters are right for life in at least one universe—is not the complete ﬁne-tuning evi-
dence that we possess. In fact, it is incomplete in at least two respects: ﬁrst, as pointed out
e.g. by White (2000), Bostrom (2002), Bradley (2012), and Landsman (2016), our full evi-
dence includes not merely R but O: that the parameters are right for life in our (i.e. this)
universe. Does the argument survive if R is replaced by O? Some philosophers argue that it
doesn’t in that, as they contend, it is fallacious to ‘suppos[e] that the existence of many
other universes makes it more likely that this one [is] life-permitting’ (White 2000, 263;
see also Hacking 1987, Draper, Draper, and Pust 2007, Leeds 2007, and Landsman
2016). The fallacy that the inference from ﬁne-tuning to the multiverse commits according
to these authors is the one that Hacking (1987) has dubbed the inverse gambler’s fallacy.
Other philosophers disagree with this diagnosis (Leslie 1988; McGrath 1988; Bostrom
2002; Holder 2002; Manson and Thrush 2003; Juhl 2005, 2007; Bradley 2009), arguing
that it overlooks an observation selection eﬀect which, when taken into account, ultimately
renders the argument valid after all. Settling that debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
Acknowledging that the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge remains as a potential stumbling
block, I will content myself to considering the version of the ﬁne-tuning argument
reviewed above and assume—as a working hypothesis—that the replacement of R by O
does not render it invalid.
The second respect in which R is not the complete ﬁne-tuning evidence is that we know
the values of the parameters with higher accuracy than R says. For example, the value of
the cosmological constant is known to be roughly L = 1.3× 10−123 (in units where the
velocity of light and Planck’s constant ℏ are 1). This value is evidently compatible with
the existence of life, but so are values two or three orders of magnitude larger (Schellekens
2013, section III.E.3). There is a broad consensus in the literature on multiverse cosmology
that speciﬁc multiverse theories are to be regarded as empirically disconﬁrmed if, accord-
ing to them, the values of the parameters that we measure are of atypical order of magni-
tude compared with the values measured by cosmic observers. Making the typicality
criterion precise is diﬃcult,6 though, notably because it is not always clear which reference
class of observers to use.7
3. Fine-tuning as Old Evidence
We have long been aware that the parameters are right for life in our universe, plausibly as
long as we have entertained the notion of laws and constants of nature at all. Accordingly,
the evidence R (or O)—that the parameters are right for life—is, strictly speaking, old evi-
dence for us. Troublingly for the proponent of the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse,
this means that succinctly staging the argument in Bayesian terms requires operating in
the framework of some solution to Bayesianism’s problem of old evidence (Glymour
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1980). Often this complication is ignored—perhaps understandably, because that problem
has no widely accepted solution. However, as suggested by Monton (2006) and Collins
(2012), the so-called ur-probability solution to the problem of old evidence has the poten-
tial to provide a framework for staging Bayesian versions of ﬁne-tuning arguments,
whether for God or the multiverse. Applying this solution eﬀectively allows us to preserve
the above formulation of the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse (modulo the com-
plications related to criticisms discussed there), while coherently taking into account the
fact that R is old evidence.
The basic idea of the ur-probability solution, also known as the counterfactual solution
and advocated notably by Colin Howson (1991), is to obtain some rational probability
function P+ that takes the old evidence E properly into account by considering a hypothe-
tical situation where E is not available, assuming that E is acquired, and then performing
ordinary Bayesian conditioning with respect to E. In the version of the ur-probability sol-
ution used by Monton, one ﬁrst considers an agent whose hypothetical epistemic situation
resembles our own as closely as possible with the sole exception that she lacks the old evi-
dence E whose impact we are trying to assess. The probability function that supposedly
captures the epistemic agent’s credences in that situation is sometimes called an ur-
prior P. This term may create some confusion, however, by evoking the image of an epis-
temic ‘ur-situation’ where no empirical background information whatsoever is available.
To avoid any misunderstanding, I will speak of the probability function P as hypothetical
prior. Its assignment is typically based on a rather substantive body of empirical back-
ground evidence—namely, everything that coherently remains of our complete evidence
once we have subtracted information about whether E.
The epistemic agent’s credences after having properly taken into account E, correspond
to our looked-for posterior P+. They are obtained from the hypothetical prior via standard
Bayesian conditioning P+(H) = P(H | E) for any hypothesisH. Crucially, the hypothetical
prior P may diﬀer from the real prior P−, which expresses our actual credences before we
systematically assess the impact of E. If, for some reason, the hypothetical prior is identical
to the real prior, i.e. if P− = P, the update rule reduces to ordinary Bayesian conditioning
P+(H) = P−(H | E), but in general this identity does not hold.
The ur-probability solution to the problem of old evidence allows us to rescue—with
minimal damage—the Bayesian formulation of the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multi-
verse in view of the insight that R is old evidence. The only adjustment required is that
one interpret P as a hypothetical prior rather than actual prior. Crucially, this means
that P(M) and P(U) may not in any way reﬂect awareness of the evidence R because
R’s evidential impact is supposed to be captured by Bayesian conditioning alone. Some-
what oddly, a hypothetical agent with credences P(M) and P(U) would have to be one
whose evidence, on the one hand, resembles the total evidence that we have as strongly
as possible while, on the other hand, it should not include the fact that the parameters
are right for life. Consequently, this hypothetical agent would have to be one who (at
least temporarily) is unaware of her own existence. Admittedly, this is a strange require-
ment to make, and it dramatically reﬂects a more general drawback of the ur-probability
solution, namely, that it can be very diﬃcult to specify reasonable hypothetical priors.
Monton, who refers to hypothetical probabilities as ur-probabilities, acknowledges this
by conceding that ‘it is not always clear what values the ur-probabilities should take,
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especially when one has to make extreme modiﬁcations to one’s opinion, by, for example,
supposing that one does not fully believe that one exists’ (Monton 2006, 416).
This drawback is severe,8 and some may argue that it undermines the application of the
ur-probability solution to ﬁne-tuning arguments. However, there seems to be no alterna-
tive way of rescuing the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse in anything resembling its
standard Bayesian formulation reviewed in section 2 (other than simply ignoring the fact
that ﬁne-tuning is old evidence), so operating on the basis of the ur-probability solution
seems to be the best among various unattractive choices. Fortunately, as we shall see, con-
siderations about priors will in the end ‘drop out’ of the discussion of double counting that
follows. This may alleviate concerns about the intelligibility of the imagined epistemic situ-
ation where an agent is pictured as unaware of her own existence.
4. Motivating a (Hypothetical) Prior for the Multiverse?
Rational belief in a multiverse as based on the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse
requires having a solid motivation for a non-negligible hypothetical prior P(M). To
appreciate this, it is useful to consider the special design hypothesis (SD), which states
that our universe is the product of a very powerful and intelligent creator ﬁxated on creat-
ing a universe exactly like ours (i.e. with physical, chemical, biological, geographical, social,
psychological further details all precisely as in our universe). Given this design of special
design, our conditional credence P(R | SD) should be 1. A hypothetical ‘ﬁne-tuning argu-
ment for special design’, analogous to the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse outlined
above, would seem to give us a very strong case for SD. The reason why we may nonethe-
less not believe in SD is that it seems (or at least may seem) ad hoc, contrived, and devoid
of independent motivation.9 Formally, this may be expressed by saying that any reasonable
hypothetical prior P(SD) will reasonably be minuscule. In fact, it may well be so tiny that
even after taking into account all our ‘conﬁrming’ evidence for SD, notably the evidence R,
our posterior P+(SD) will still be negligible.10
Perhaps the multiverse hypothesis M is similarly contrived and devoid of independent
motivation as the special design hypothesis! Lacking a compelling argument to the con-
trary, even if the ﬁnding that the parameters are right for life does turn out to conﬁrm
the multiverse hypothesis over a rival single-universe hypothesis (i.e. even if the criticisms
outlined in section 2 can be overcome), its outcome may not be rational conﬁdence in the
multiverse but only some degree of belief that, though larger than any rational hypothe-
tical prior P(M), is still negligibly small. The example of SD suggests that proponents of the
ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse should have a good case for a non-negligible
hypothetical prior P(M).
According to Juhl, however, there are principled reasons for believing that there can be
no such case:
One worry that I have about an argument for an actual multiverse is that such an argument
would have to somehow convince us that the prior probability P(M) of a multiverse hypoth-
esis is high enough on any reasonable probability assignment to warrant assigning it a high
posterior (higher than 1/2, say). I do not foresee a convincing a priori argument for this,
either on the basis of principles of indiﬀerence, or on the basis of a rationally compelling
‘logical’ approach to assignments of priors. But if we try to assign rational ‘prior’ probabilities
on an a posteriori basis of empirical evidence, as a means of avoiding ‘purely a priori’
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approaches and their attendant diﬃculties, then we might ﬁnd it diﬃcult to avoid a problem
to be described below … . The problem might be called a fallacy of (evidential) ‘double
dipping’. (Juhl 2007, 554)
What would be an ‘a priori argument’ for a non-negligible (hypothetical) prior P(M)?
One could try an appeal to simplicity or elegance in favour of the ‘world ensemble’ hypoth-
esis (Carter 1974, 295), according to which all mathematically possible combinations of
values of the parameters that appear in the laws of our universe are realised, each in at
least one universe. However, in view of the highly speculative character of such stipula-
tions it seems wise to accept Juhl’s sceptical attitude and rather focus on attempts to
obtain a well-motivated P(M) based on, as he calls it, ‘an a posteriori basis of empirical
evidence.’ Why is Juhl pessimistic about such attempts as well?
Let us look at a prima facie attractive way of motivating a non-negligible P(M) ‘on an a
posteriori basis’, namely, by developing, testing, and empirically conﬁrming some funda-
mental physical theory T, e.g. about elementary particles, ﬁelds, and their interactions,
which, as a ‘side eﬀect’, suggests or entails the existence of multiple universes. One way
for a theory T to have this feature would be by suggesting a physical mechanism of
how multiple universes with diﬀerent parameters are dynamically generated. There
seems to be no reason why it should be impossible in principle to acquire empirical
data in our universe that suggest such a theory T. And any data D that we might possibly
gather in support of T would then indirectly support the multiverse hypothesis M in the
form suggested by T—over and above the support that, according to the ﬁne-tuning argu-
ment,M receives from R. And, as it seems, one way of taking this independent support for
M into account would be by choosing a non-negligible hypothetical prior P(M) that
reﬂects the impact of D via T.
In fact, the idea of a fundamental physical theory T that is multiverse-friendly in the
required sense is not mere ﬁction. According to many contemporary physicists, we do
have such a theory, in the form of the combination of inﬂationary cosmology and string
theory, two intensely pursued theoretical frameworks of cosmology and high energy
physics, respectively.11 For the sake of concreteness, it is useful to outline how these
two theories, when combined, are taken to suggest a concrete multiverse scenario, the
so-called landscape multiverse (Susskind 2005).12
Inﬂationary cosmology, which is currently the dominant theoretical framework of early
universe cosmology, states that the early universe expands (near-) exponentially fast,
resulting in causally isolated space-time regions, so-called ‘island universes’. Importantly
for our present interests, according to many dynamical models of inﬂation this process is
‘eternal’ in that the formation of island universes never ends. As a result of this process, a
vast (and, according to most models, inﬁnite) ‘multiverse’ of island universes is continually
being produced (Guth 2000). If we add the perspective of string theory to this picture, it
becomes plausible that the parameters may vary between island universes. The reason for
this is that string theory, one of the leading approaches to unify our best theories of particle
physics and gravity, has an enormous variety (‘landscape’) of lowest energy states or
vacua.13 If string theory is correct, diﬀerent vacua manifest themselves at the level of
observations and experiments in terms of diﬀerent higher-level physical laws and
diﬀerent values of the constants. Thus, when combined, inﬂationary cosmology and
string theory suggest a cosmological picture in which there are inﬁnitely many island
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universes in which all diﬀerent string theory vacua—corresponding to diﬀerent higher-
level physical laws and constants—are actually realised in the diﬀerent island universes.
If, as is widely believed, this landscape multiverse includes a universe with the same
higher-level laws and constants as our own, it is a candidate multiverse scenario in the
sense of the ﬁne-tuning argument.
Both inﬂationary cosmology and string theory are at present speculative to a signiﬁcant
degree. Inﬂationary cosmology has some relatively direct empirical support in the form of
its multiply conﬁrmed, very precise predictions of the shape of the cosmic microwave
background (CMB) ﬂuctuations, as recently measured with unprecented accuracy by
the PLANCK satellite (Planck Collaboration 2014).14 But there is no direct empirical evi-
dence for string theory at all, and not even the theory’s most ardent advocates seem to
expect such evidence for the next few decades. However, what matters for the more prin-
cipled purposes of this paper is what this example illustrates: at least apparently, empirical
evidence for the combination of inﬂationary cosmology and string theory might help us
motivate a non-negligible P(M).
5. The Double-counting Charge Stated
Juhl acknowledges that theories such as inﬂationary cosmology and string theory might
independently suggest some version of the multiverse hypothesis. He does not think,
however, that they can be used to motivate a non-negligible P(M), due to a diﬃculty
related to double counting (‘double dipping’, as he calls it):
I do not foresee a plausible scenario in which what I call the ‘prior’ of the existence of the law
or mechanism for universe production can be rationally constrained to be reasonably high,
without that ‘prior’ itself depending on evidence entailing the existence of a universe much
like ours. To make clear what I have in mind here, suppose that physicists come up with a
‘uniﬁed theory of everything’ [T ]15, which entails that the existence of a multiverse has a
probability of around 1/2. How will they discover such a theory? Surely [T ] will be obtained
via observations of goings-on within our universe. Such goings-on will entail the existence of
our universe, that universe of which they are parts, or within which they are events. But if
such events form the evidential basis for assigning a not-too-low probability to a theory M
of multiverse production, then we cannot reuse or ‘double dip’ that same evidence, the exist-
ence of our universe, to provide further support to the theory. (Juhl 2007, 555)
The gist of this passage is that any observational data D that we might collect in support of
some multiverse-friendly theory T will unavoidably entail the ﬁnding R according to
which the parameters are right for life in some universe. Juhl’s argument is deceptively
simple: any data D that we might collect will unavoidably be about ‘goings-on within
our universe’; goings-on within our universe unavoidably ‘entail the existence of our uni-
verse’; and, since our universe has the right parameters for life, its existence entails the
existence of a universe where the parameters are right for life, i.e. it entails R. And if
any D indeed entails R, then basing one’s prior P(M) on D means implicitly using R in
that step. Accordingly, using R when running the ﬁne-tuning argument to boost our cre-
dence inM would mean using R again and would hence means illegitimate double count-
ing of R.
Juhl is adamant that the double counting charge goes beyond highlighting that the ﬁne-
tuning argument in its Bayesian formulation must come to terms with the problem of old
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evidence. It is useful, though, to frame the double counting charge in the language of the
ur-probability solution, where it amounts to the worry that no empirical evidence whatso-
ever can be relevant when assessing P(M), construed as a hypothetical prior. According to
Juhl, data D that are potentially relevant to our credence in M—since they are from our
universe—are likely to entail that the parameters are right for life in that universe. But
this means that they cannot possibly be available to an epistemic agent in the hypothetical
situation invoked by the ur-probability solution, who, by assumption, is unaware that the
parameters are right for life. If Juhl is right, it is in principle impossible to motivate any
chosen value for the hypothetical prior P(M) by appeal to empirical evidence, notably
any non-negligible value.
Is it plausible, if we look at the example of the landscape multiverse outlined in the pre-
vious section, that multiverse-supporting empirical data will inevitably entail R: that the
parameters are right for life? Prima facie it may seem quite realistic. The CMB data, for
example, which support inﬂationary cosmology and thereby (indirectly) the landscape
multiverse, may indeed entail at least large bits of the evidence R according to which
the parameters are right for life: the CMB radiation is electromagnetic, so a detailed
description of it will include information about the values of the constants associated
with electromagnetism. Moreover, a detailed account of how an early inﬂationary phase
—if it occurred—resulted in CMB ﬂuctuations as detected today will inevitably rely on
auxiliary assumptions concerning other fundamental interactions that have shaped our
universe in the meantime. As a consequence, the constants associated with other inter-
actions—the weak and strong nuclear interactions and gravity—are likely to be signiﬁ-
cantly constrained, and thus in part entailed, by such an account as well.
To sum up, Juhl’s worry that empirical data that favour a multiverse cosmology will
entail that the parameters are right for life (or at least signiﬁcant parts of it) deserves
being taken seriously. But if Juhl is correct, multiverse proponents who rely on the ﬁne-
tuning argument face a dilemma: they can either run the ﬁne-tuning argument, but
without relying on a well-motivated non-negligible (hypothetical) prior P(M) (thus poten-
tially ending up in a similar situation as those who run the ﬁne-tuning argument for special
design without having a good independent case for a non-negligible hypothetical prior
P(SD)); or they can make a well-founded assignment of P(M) based on observational
data D (perhaps indirectly via appeal to empirical support for some multiverse-friendly
theory T ), but then they are no longer able to run the ﬁne-tuning argument without
counting R twice because D inevitably entails R. In the following, ﬁnal, section I explore
how multiverse friends can address this challenge.
6. The Fine-tuning Argument for the Multiverse without Double Counting
This section argues that it is at least in principle possible to motivate a non-negligible
hypothetical prior P(M) using empirical data D and to subsequently run the ﬁne-tuning
argument without double counting of R. The key idea is that, for suitable data D, there
are generally parts or aspects D∗ of D that do not entail R and may still be multiverse-
supporting.
To see this, consider the following: suppose that we have indeed managed to acquire
data D that help us motivate the ascription of a non-negligible P(M). For the sake of
the argument, let us suppose that, as Juhl suggests, these data D entail parts or all of R.
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Now suppose further—without loss of generality—that D, speciﬁed in propositional form,
is closed under deductive inference (alternatively, assume thatD is the deductive closure of
our multiverse-suggesting empirical data in propositional form). Generally, D will not be
logically equivalent to R—even ifD entails R—unless R entails all ofD, for which, however,
there seems to be no systematic reason. In general, there will be a non-empty subset D∗ of
D that is not entailed by R, i.e. is logically compatible with ¬R. As I argue below, it is poss-
ible for this D∗ to be multiverse-supporting on its own.
To check whetherD∗ can legitimately be used to motivate a non-negligible hypothetical
prior P(M) we have to go back to the ur-probability approach to Bayesianism and consider
a hypothetical agent who lacks the evidence R but has otherwise as much of our back-
ground knowledge as coherently possible. And whatever that background knowledge com-
prises—remember, we are considering an agent who, bizarrely, is unaware of her own
existence—there seems to be no reason to doubt that it will include D∗. For, by assump-
tion, we are aware of D∗ and, by construction, D∗ is not entailed by R. If it happens that D∗
alone can be appealed to when motivating a non-negligible P(M), then running the ﬁne-
tuning argument based on the so-motivated P(M) does not involve any double counting
and may potentially result in a sizeable P+(M).
Avoiding double counting along these lines is possible only if two conditions are met:
ﬁrst, the evidence R must not entail our multiverse-supporting data D (for otherwise D∗
would be empty); second, D∗ on its own—and not merely the full D—must be multiverse-
supporting. Taken together, these two conditions boil down to the simple and intuitive
requirement that, for the ﬁne-tuning argument to result in rational belief in a multiverse,
there must be independent empirical support for the multiverse over and above the ﬁnding
that the parameters are right for life despite the required ﬁne-tuning. Priors (or hypothe-
tical priors) play no role in this requirement. This is an appealing feature because problems
with double counting are not by themselves conceptually tied to diﬃculties with the
assignment of (hypothetical) priors, so it makes sense that we can ultimately assess the
double counting issue without considering speciﬁc (hypothetical) priors. What would
really vindicate the double counting charge is an argument as to why there cannot possibly
be any independent empirical support for the multiverse over and above the ﬁnding that
the parameters are right for life despite the required ﬁne-tuning.
It seems unlikely, though, that such an argument will be forthcoming. According to the
popular account of inﬂationary cosmology sketched in section 4, our data about the
cosmic microwave background (CMB) are conﬁrmatory of inﬂationary cosmology,
which in turn (at least indirectly) suggests that the landscape multiverse scenario might
be correct. Clearly, not all aspects of the CMB data are entailed by R, notably not all
those that are taken to support inﬂation. If the aspects of the CMB reported by Planck Col-
laboration (2014) that favour inﬂation were all entailed by R, scientists would have been
able to predict them, based on R alone and without any help from inﬂationary cosmology.
So we have here empirical data D∗, in this case concerning the CMB, which are part of our
complete multiverse-suggesting dataD but not entailed by R. Since these dataD∗ are conﬁ-
rmatory, on their own, of a multiverse-suggesting theory (inﬂation), they are (at least
indirectly) multiverse-suggesting by themselves. If we use them to help motivating a
non-negligible P(M), we can run the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multiverse based on
the so-motivated P(M), potentially resulting in a sizeable posterior P+(M), without com-
mitting double counting.
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In case future developments in physics establish that the account of inﬂationary cos-
mology and the CMB data relied on here is incorrect, it would not damage the present
claims. The empirical assumptions made are coherent, and this suﬃces to establish that
it is in principle possible, given suitable data, to motivate a non-negligible P(M)
without implicitly relying on the ﬁnding that the parameters are right for life.
Juhl’s warning of double counting is by no means superﬂuous, though. As we have seen,
it is realistic that empirical data D appealed to when motivating a non-negligible prior
P(M) entail (parts of) the evidence R. In concrete cases, separating those bits of D that
entail R from those that do not and establishing that the latter are multiverse-supporting
on their own may well be an arduous task.
That it is in principle possible to motivate a non-negligible P(M) independently of the
appeal to the ﬁnding that the parameters are right for life does of course not entail that it is
presently rational for us to actually believe in a multiverse, given the available evidence,
ﬁne-tuning as well as other. As outlined in section 2, the ﬁne-tuning argument for the mul-
tiverse faces various open challenges that apply even if, as argued here, it can in principle
be saved from the double counting charge. Notably, for the currently most popular multi-
verse scenario—the landscape multiverse sketched in section 4—it remains unclear
whether it merits the ascription of a non-negligible prior. String theory, the scenario’s
second pillar beside inﬂationary cosmology, is not completely understood from a concep-
tual point of view and, more importantly, lacks any direct empirical support. Moreover, it
has not been rigorously established whether the landscape multiverse, if it really exists,
does include a universe with exactly the same laws and constants as our own in the
ﬁrst place. But unless we obtain really robust independent empirical evidence for some
speciﬁc multiverse scenario, the argument from ﬁne-tuning for the multiverse remains
tentative at best.
Notes
1. For popular overviews of the ﬁne-tuning for life of various constants, boundary conditions,
and even laws of nature themselves, see Leslie (1989, ch. 2), Davies (1982), Rees (2000), and
Lewis and Barnes (2016); for more technical ones see Hogan (2000, 2007) and Barnes (2012).
For an up-to-date overview of suggested reactions to ﬁne-tuning for life, see Friederich
(2017). Constants, boundary conditions, and laws are collectively referred to as ‘parameters’
in what follows.
2. Carter’s famous (weak and strong) anthropic principles (Carter 1974) remind us that this tri-
viality may play an important role when assessing the impact of data concerning facts that are
required to obtain for there to be observers. See Barrow and Tipler (1986), Earman (1987),
Leslie (1989), McMullin (1993), and Bostrom (2002) for interpretation of the anthropic prin-
ciples and the nuanced diﬀerences between them.
3. The main alternative to the Bayesian formulation is to frame the argument as an inference to
the best explanation. Using Leslie’s terminology (Leslie 1989, ch. 6) the candidate explanation
in question would be an ‘anthropic’ one. It is controversial, however, whether anthropic
‘explanations’ really qualify as such (see Earman 1987, 309 for criticism). Since ‘explanation’
is such a complicated notion and recent research on the ﬁne-tuning argument for the multi-
verse has overwhelmingly focused on the Bayesian formulation, the present paper follows
that route.
4. Hypotheses according to which certain constants vary across one and the same universe
count as multiverse scenarios in the sense of the present discussion. Current empirical evi-
dence does not seem to support such hypotheses (Uzan 2003).
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5. This worry is developed into a fully ﬂedged objection against the ﬁne-tuning argument for
the multiverse (and against the ﬁne-tuning argument for intelligent design) along varying
lines by McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup (2001), Colyvan, Garﬁeld, and Priest (2005), and
Juhl (2006).
6. Typicality considerations were pioneered by Carter (1974) and Leslie (1989). The typicality
criteria most appealed to by physicists are Vilenkin’s principle of mediocrity (Vilenkin 1995)
and Bostrom’s self-sampling assumption (Bostrom 2002). Typicality criteria can be regarded
as indiﬀerence principles of self-locating belief: inasmuch as we are ignorant about who and
where among observers we are, an assumption of typicality advises us to treat all possibilities
as equally likely. A restricted indiﬀerence principle of self-locating belief that shares some
implications with the aforementioned typicality criteria is Elga’s Indiﬀerence (Elga 2004).
7. Matters are especially complicated if the reference class of observers is inﬁnite because typi-
cality criteria are then diﬃcult to evaluate. This raises a thorny issue known as the measure
problem of cosmology, see Schellekens (2013, section VI.B) for an introduction to this
problem, Smeenk (2014) for a philosopher’s sceptical assessment of its solvability, and Arnt-
zenius and Dorr (2017) for a more optimistic perspective.
8. An alternative solution to the problem of old evidence, which would avoid this drawback, is
the approach due to Garber (1983), in which Bayesian conditioning is applied not to the old
evidence itself but rather to the insight that the theory or hypothesis in question—in our case
the multiverse hypothesis—entails or, in other versions (e.g. Hartmann and Fitelson 2015),
explains the old evidence—in our case the ﬁne-tuning evidence. Applying Garber-style sol-
utions to the ﬁne-tuning argument is far from straightforward, though, because the
general multiverse hypothesis M neither entails R nor uncontroversially explains it. It is
far from evident how to stage the ﬁne-tuning argument in a Garberian framework.
9. For this reason, we would also be reluctant to accept SD by inference to the best explanation.
The problem of whether the multiverse hypothesis can be motivated independently of the
ﬁne-tuning considerations arises not only on the Bayesian formulation.
10. Monton argues that even for some appropriately chosen general ‘Design’ hypothesis D the
rational posterior P+(D) will likely be very small if we construe the prior P(D) as a hypothe-
tical (or ur-) prior. Whether this is true or not, since D is more inclusive than SD, the pos-
terior P+(SD) cannot be higher than the posterior P+(D).
11. One may think that some version of the Everett or ‘many worlds’ interpretation of quantum
theory would be an even better example of an independently motivated multiverse theory.
Quantum theory does indeed enjoy excellent empirical support and, according to proponents
of the Everett interpretation, their view is preferable over alternatives in view of widely recog-
nised criteria such as elegance and simplicity (see Wallace 2012 for a much more complete
case). However, unless supplemented by some dynamical account of how and why the par-
ameters would vary across Everettian ‘worlds’ (or ‘branches’), Everettian quantum theory is
not a multiverse scenario in the sense of the ﬁne-tuning argument. There are, however,
attempts to bring together Everettian quantum theory and multiverse theories in the sense
of the ﬁne-tuning argument (see e.g. Bousso and Susskind 2011).
12. As an anonymous referee points out to me, there are serious principled worries about the
possibility to coherently combine string theory and inﬂation. See Steinhardt and Wesley
(2009) for serious concerns.
13. See Schellekens (2013) for a helpful introduction to string theory and its motivation and
Dawid (1982) for (controversial) methodological arguments for string theory with particular
emphasis on the absence of compelling theoretical alternatives.
14. According to earlier claims (Steinhardt and Turok 2008), there are non-inﬂationary cyclic
cosmological models which are as good in predicting the detected CMB ﬂuctuations as
inﬂationary models. However, according to Planck Collaboration (2014), the newest obser-
vations support inﬂationary models over cyclic ones. Further alleged explanatory achieve-
ments of inﬂationary cosmology include its supposed ability to account for otherwise
puzzling cosmic coincidences, notably the so-called ﬂatness, horizon and magnetic monopole
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problems of cosmology, reviewed in Guth (2000). For philosophers’ (partly critical) assess-
ments of these claimed achievements see Earman and Mosterín (1999) and McCoy (2015).
15. Juhl uses ‘U’ instead of ‘T’, which would lead to confusion with the single-universe theory U
considered above.
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